- Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
- Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image?
- Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?
- Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence?
- Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?
- Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another?
- Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?
- Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?
- Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude?
- Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?
- Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?
- Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?
- Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?
- Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?
- Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence?
- Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons?
- Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person?
- Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?
[Q39 / A2]
Objection 1: It would seem not right to say that the three persons are of one essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost “are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony.” But the substance of God is His essence. Therefore the three persons are not of one essence.
Reply: Substance is here taken for the “hypostasis,” and not for the essence.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are of one essence. Therefore this should not be asserted.
Reply: Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so many words that the three persons are of one essence, nevertheless we find it so stated as regards the meaning; for instance, “I and the Father are one (Jn. 10:30),” and “I am in the Father, and the Father in Me (Jn. 10:38)”; and there are many other texts of the same import.
Objection 3: Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine essence. It suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of one nature.
Reply: Because “nature” designates the principle of action while “essence” comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give heat; but only those things can be said to be of “one essence” which have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying that the three persons are “of one essence,” than by saying they are “of one nature.”
Objection 4: Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore it does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one essence.
Reply: Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say “the virtue of Peter.” On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one signifying the form, and the other signifying the determination of the form, as, for instance, when we say, “Peter is of great virtue [magnae virtutis],” or else one genitive must have the force of two, as, for instance, “he is a man of blood”—that is, he is a man who sheds much blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence signifies a form as regards the person, it may properly be said that the essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse, unless we add some term to designate the essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of the “divine essence”; or, the three persons are “of one essence.”
Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not say that the three persons are “from one essence [ex una essentia],” lest we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the persons in God. But prepositions which imply transition, denote the oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three persons are “of one essence [unius essentiae].”
Reply: The preposition “from” or “out of” does not designate the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an efficient or material cause; which causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For nothing can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a thing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So, when we say, “three persons of one essence,” taking essence as having the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is different from person, which we should mean if we said, “three persons from the same essence.”
Objection 6: Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion of error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one essence or substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says (De Synod.): “One substance predicated of the Father and the Son signifies either one subsistent, with two denominations; or one substance divided into two imperfect substances; or a third prior substance taken and assumed by the other two.” Therefore it must not be said that the three persons are of one substance.
Reply: As Hilary says (De Synod.): “It would be prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do not think them holy. So if some misunderstand homoousion, what is that to me, if I understand it rightly? … The oneness of nature does not result from division, or from union or from community of possession, but from one nature being proper to both Father and Son.”