- Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
- Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image?
- Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?
- Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence?
- Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?
- Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another?
- Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?
- Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?
- Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude?
- Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?
- Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?
- Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?
- Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?
- Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?
- Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence?
- Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons?
- Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person?
- Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?
[Q13 / A2]
Objection 1: It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): “Everything said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or operation.”
Reply: Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): “You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God.” Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.
Reply: In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, as for instance, this name “stone” [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone [*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word “lapis” which has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say “God lives,” the sense were, “life proceeds from Him”; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.
Reply: We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.