- Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
- Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image?
- Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?
- Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence?
- Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?
- Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another?
- Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?
- Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?
- Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude?
- Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?
- Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?
- Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?
- Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?
- Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?
- Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence?
- Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons?
- Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person?
- Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?
[Q12 / A8]
Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God see all things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): “What do they not see, who see Him Who sees all things?” But God sees all things. Therefore those who see God see all things.
Reply: Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.
Objection 2: Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.
Reply: It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror itself.
Objection 3: Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand the least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God does, or can do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever
understands God, can understand all that God does, or can do.
Reply: Although it is more to see God than to see all things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in this article that the more things are known in God according as He is seen more or less perfectly.
Objection 4: Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things, its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees God knows all things.
Reply: The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely, the species and the genera of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): “Unhappy the man who knoweth all these” (i.e. all creatures) “and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee alone.”