- Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
- Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image?
- Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?
- Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence?
- Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?
- Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another?
- Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?
- Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?
- Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude?
- Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?
- Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?
- Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?
- Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?
- Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?
- Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence?
- Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons?
- Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person?
- Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?
[Q12 / A4]
Objection 1: It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God.” But if a reflection is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power understands himself, it seems that by his own natural power he understands the Divine essence.
Reply: This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel—namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above (A[2]). Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.
Objection 2: Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other intelligible things by his own natural power, much more can he understand God.
Reply: The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it ought to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it does not possess the excellence which is in God.
Objection 3: Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above (A[1]). Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence.
Reply: The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.